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Introduction 
 
 
Thank you, Professor Mii ig and ReCon- 
Fort, for inviting me to give this lecture and 
for your excellent hospitality, which has 
made my visit to the Carl Friedrich von Sie- 
mens Foundation here in Munich a great 
pleasure. 
This lecture might just as well have 
been entitled The Westminster Parliament's 
Formal and Substantive Sovereignty, but the 
extension would have been long and inel- 
egant, and, as it stands and as will become 
apparent, the title reflects the exercise of 
sovereignty' that resulted in the United 
Kingdom's Brexit referendum on 3 June 
of this year.  On the  Brexit  referendum, 
I should add that I am pleased at least to 
come from Cambridge and to be close to 
London - two cities that strongly supported 
the Remain campaign! 
Advocacy of Brexit was expressed with 
the popular slogan "Take back control", 
which has two main dimensions - "control 
of borders" on the one hand, and "control 
of laws" on the other. The second of these 
raises the issue of Parliament's sovereign- 
ty, which has held the status of the ultimate 
legal and political principle, the Grund- 
norm, or the basic rule of recognition, in 
much positivist legal thinking about the 
British legal systemz. "Control of borders" 
was of far greater political significance, but 
"Control of laws" was also significant both 
in its general appeal to most Brexit leaders 
(not Nigel Parage, but Boris Johnson, Liam 
Fox and Michael Gove for example) and to 
those from the intelligentsia who support- 
ed Brexit, and as a veneer of respectability 
for the less seemly side of "Control of bor- 
ders" relating to immigration. 
Now, my college in Cambridge  is 
Queens' College, and, in the  lead-up  to 
the Brexit referendum, two of our former 
students who are now Members of Parlia- 
ment (MPs) - on opposite sides - came to 
debate the issues. The one alumnus is La- 
hour Party MP Stephen Kinnock, the son 
of former Leader of the Opposition and 
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former European Commissioner Neil Kin- 
nock (and Stephen is married to the former 
Prime Minister of Denmark Helle Thorn- 
ing-Schmidt),  The other alumna is Con- 
servative Party MP Suella Fernandes, who 
was elected in the General Election last year 
( 015), and who was therefore worrying that 
almost her fust main move as an MP was to 
oppose her Prime Minister  and Govern- 
ment by campaigning for Brexit, What were 
striking in their debate on the issues were 
two contrasting and competing conceptions 
of the Westminster Parliament's sovereign- 
ty (as it was in other debates on the Brexit 
referendum),  Suella Fernandes, who had 
studied law at university, presented a legal 
conception, one that had been encroached 
upon formally through the effective asser- 
tion of the supremacy  of Community  law 
by the ECJ (as they were then called) and 
thereafter through acceptance of that su- 
premacy by the British courts, defmitively 
by the House of Lords (as it was then called) 
in the Factortame  litigation3, resulting in 
disapplication  of provisions  of the Mer- 
chant Shipping Act 1988 enacted by Parlia- 
ment, Stephen Kinnock, in contrast, pre- 
sented a substantive  political  conception 
of the reality of what Parliament can and 
cannot do, He argued that EU membership 
actually enhances Parliament's sovereignty 
by enabling it to do much more through the 
EU than it would otherwise be able to do, He 
argued further, as I remember, that Brexit 
would make little difference to the practi- 
cal constraints on Parliament's sovereign- 
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ty, because international trade deals by the 
UK with the EU (as with other state entities 
or states elsewhere) would thereafter be 
conditioned on compliance with such con- 
straints (Prime Minister Cameron went so 
far as to say that Parliament's sovereignty in 
the minds of the Brexit campaigners was an 
illusion). 
Explaining the background and relative 
significance of the contrasting conceptions 
of the Westminster Parliament's sover- 
eignty, exemplified  in that Brexit debate 
wrong ...? Suella had been taught, as the 
usual starting point, Dicey's account of par- 
liamentary sovereignty, but, in retrospect, 
we in English academia may well have paid 
too much attention to his one pillar of the 
British Constitution - the rule of law - the 
various formal and substantive conceptions 
of the rule oflaw5, atthe expense ofhis oth- 
er pillar- the sovereignty of Parliament. 
in Queens' College, is the subject of this 
lecture. It has four main parts. First, I will 
seek to explain this dichotomy of formal 
legal and substantive political conceptions 
I. Dicey's 
Substantive 
Sovereignty 
Dichotomy of 
 Formal and 
Conceptions  of    Parliament's 
of Parliament's sovereignty as a doctrinal 
product of Albert Venn Dicey's founda- 
tional multi-edition textbook The Law of 
the Constitution, first published in 18854. 
Secondly, I will suggest the historical sig- 
nificance of Dicey's exposition, relative to 
prominent earlier constitutional writings 
and in relation to the theme of juridifica- 
tion in the ReConFort project. Thirdly, I 
will present various prominent manifesta- 
tions of the formal legal conception of the 
Westminster Parliament's sovereignty, and 
of the concurrence or simultaneous role of 
various substantive conceptions alongside 
the formal. Fourthly and finally, I will focus 
on the real and/or apparent transfer of sov- 
ereign powers to the EU institutions as the 
backdrop to Brexit and its implications. 
Let me return, first, to the Brexit de- 
bate in Queens' College. My own, personal, 
problem is that, in context, on the impli- 
cations of Brexit for Parliament's  sover- 
eignty, I agreed with Stephen Kinnock but 
I had supervised/tutored Suella Fernandes 
in Constitutional Law at Queens' College. 
What had I taught her and where had I gone 
In his treatment of Parliament's sovereign- 
ty, Dicey was concerned with two obser- 
vational difficulties for someone studying 
the English constitution 6 (as he called it). 
The one was that Parliament was said to 
be sovereign, but sovereignty was at least 
shared with the electorate through Parlia- 
ment's representative  character. The oth- 
er was that sovereignty was said to be un- 
limited, but was clearly subject to limited 
practicability  in day-to-day  politics.  His 
answer to these observational  difficulties 
for students studying the constitution was 
to distinguish between the legal sense of 
Parliament's sovereignty - the lack of any 
legal limit to law making- and the political 
sense in which the electorate (through the 
House of Commons), the House of Lords 
and the King were sovereign. This distinc- 
tion overlapped with a second distinction. 
Parliament's sovereignty in its legal sense 
was theoretically limitless, whereas its sov- 
ereignty in its political sense was subject to 
various,  innumerable,  limits in actuality. 
In expounding the law of the constitution, 
Dicey's focus was purely on the legal con- 
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ception, and it provided a basic rule - "an 
undoubted legal fact" (thus largely unjusti- 
ned in Dicey's account) - for the courts to 
obey/apply any parliamentary legislative 
enactment whatever  its content?. Part of 
the rule reflected 8 the maxim <<Parliament 
cannot bind its successors>>.  It required 
that, if a later Act of Parliament is incon- 
sistent with an earlier Act, the later Act be 
taken to have repealed by implication the 
earlier Act to the extent of the inconsisten- 
cy. Dicey's legal conception of Parliament's 
sovereignty was formal, even ftctitious, be- 
cause it required the courts to treat Parlia- 
ment' s sovereignty as limitless although it 
was clearly limited in political actuality or 
practicability. 
Dicey's comparative constitutional lec- 
tures were ftrst delivered and written from 
1895 to 1900, but they were lost both to the 
public and academia until about 1985, and 
they remained largely unpublished until 
publication of The Oxford Edition of Dicey 
in oi39. They now shed light on Dicey's 
account of Parliament's sovereignty in an 
important way. Contrasting the different 
spirits of different constitutions (such as 
the civil administrative spirit of French 
constitutionalism or the military spirit of 
Prussian constitutionalism of his day) he 
described the legal spirit of the institutions 
of the English constitution 10. For him, that 
legal spirit was a love for legal forms and an 
acquiescence in ftctions, such as the ftc- 
tion in the seventeenth century that King 
Charles II immediately succeeded King 
Charles I. That was the ftction by which 
<<Englishmen ... contrived to forget the fall 
of the monarchy>>, with the effect that <<the 
very memory of the Interregnum>> from 
1649 to 166o (when the reigns of Charles I 
and Charles II were separated by the Com- 
 
 
6o 
monwealth of England and the Protector- 
ate) was <<blotted out from popular tradi- 
tion>>". For Dicey, the English constitution 
was viewed from the perspective of a peo- 
ple with <<a legal turn of mind and a love 
for forms and precedents>> who <<imbued 
with legalism ... import into their political 
arrangements that love of precedent and 
acquiescence in ftctions which is proper to 
the law courts>> IZ. Dicey's formal legal con- 
ception of  Parliament's  sovereignty'3,  its 
longevity and influence were in accordance 
with that legal spirit, as was that spirit's im- 
portation into the English political arena. 
 
 
 
 
II. The Historical Significance of Dicey's 
Exposition of the Law of the Constitution and 
of Parliament's Sovereignty 
 
What is also clear from Dicey's comparative 
constitutional lectures is that he saw the 
English constitution as the prime example 
of a historical constitution, as did most of 
his contemporaries, exhibiting character- 
istics of"antiquity"," continuity", etc.'4 His 
conception of it as a historical constitution 
is consistent with his abundant historical 
references, in his famous work The Law of 
the Constitution, to the antiquity of Parlia- 
ment' s sovereignty and the critical impor- 
tance of the formative struggles between 
Crown and Parliament in the seventeenth 
century'S. 
The historical signiftcance of Dicey's ex- 
position, however, was principally the thor- 
oughness, authority and lasting influence of 
his attempt to juridify or juridicalise, even 
judicialise, the English historical constitu- 
tion through legal doctrine in The Law of the 
Constitution. He put the rule of law in pride 
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of place as the second pillar of the consti- 
tution.  The third  meaning he attributed  to 
the rule of law (after his fust two meanings 
centred on legal certainty and equality be- 
fore the law) was of the English constitution 
itself as the <<result of [the] ordinary law of 
the land>>, principally  <<the consequence 
of the rights of individuals, as defmed and 
enforced by the Courts>>'6 . Further, par- 
liamentary sovereignty was his ftrst-stated 
pillar of the English constitution, but the 
conception with which he was concerned 
was a legal and theoretical conception. It 
was the conception of the <<Unlimited leg- 
islative authority of Parliament>>, the lack 
of any limit to law making, providing the 
rule for the courts that they apply whatever 
Parliament enacts in an Act of Parliament'?. 
It was distinct from the political concep- 
tion of Parliament's sovereignty subject to 
external and internal limits, constraining 
actual political practicability' 8. 
Earlier prominent writings on the Eng- 
lish constitution, such as those of Coke, 
Blackstone, De Lolme, Cox and Hearn'9, 
emphasised or listed all that Parliament 
could do in the exercise of its sovereign 
legislative authority. According to Edward 
Coke in 1644zo, 
 
Of the power and jurisdiction of the parliament, 
for making of laws in proceeding by bill, it is so 
transcendent and absolute, as it cannot be con- 
fined either for causes or persons within any 
bounds. Of this court it is truly said: Si antiquita- 
tem spectes. est etustissima. si dignitatem. est hono- 
ratissima. si jurisdictionem. est capacissima. 
 
In 1765 William Blackstone, after quot- 
ing Coke's passage, listed all that Parlia- 
ment could do and all the matters in respect 
of which they could be doneZ': 
 
[Parliament] hath sovereign  and  uncontrola- 
ble authority in making,  confirming,  enlarging, 
restraining,  abrogating,   repealing,   reviving, 
and expounding of laws, concerning matters of 
all possible denominations, ecclesiastical, or 
temporal, civil, military, maritime, or criminal: 
this being the place where that absolute despot- 
ic power, which must in all governments reside 
somewhere, is entrusted by the constitution of 
these kingdoms. 
 
These writings lack the distinction be- 
tween legal and political conceptions, with 
the legal conception providing a rule for 
the courts. In 1867, according to William 
Hearnzz  (to whom  Dicey  expressed  his 
greatest indebtedness in his prefaceZ 3), 
 
It is now universally conceded that the authority 
of Parliament in matters of legislation is unlim- 
ited ... [W]hen the meaning [of an Act of Parlia- 
ment] is clear, it is the duty of the Court not to 
question the wisdom of the statute but to obey its 
commands. 
 
Thus Hearn also presented parliamen- 
tary sovereignty as providing a rule for the 
courts, but he did not elaborate a distinc- 
tion between legal and political concep- 
tions of sovereignty, as did Dicey. 
 
 
 
 
III. Manifestations of the Fonnal Legal 
Conception  of  Parliament's  Sovereignty   and 
of the Concurrence of Substantive  Conceptions 
 
In various ways since Dicey's The Law of the 
Constitution was ftrst published, the highly 
formal quality of the Westminster Parlia- 
ment's legal sovereignty has been manifest 
in its exercise to the great detriment of its 
substantive sovereignty, and has accord- 
ingly provoked unease. 
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3.1.    One manifestation was in the process 
of decolonisation through parliamentary 
enactments of the Westminster Parliament 
conferring self-government or independ- 
ence on colonies and dominions. They con- 
tributed to a much earlier, imperial, form of 
transnational constitutionalism in Britain 
and the rest of the British Commonwealth, 
which became the Commonwealth of Na- 
tions. In strict legal theory, Parliament 
retained the right to legislate for the inde- 
pendent dominions initially subject only to 
the convention that it not does so without 
the consent of a dominion. The Statute of 
Westminster 1931 removed limitations on 
the competence of dominion parliaments 
and effectively replaced the convention 
with the provision in section 4= 
 
No Act of  Parliament of the United Kingdom 
passed after the commencement of this Act shall 
extend, or be deemed to extend, to a Dominion 
as part of the law of that Dominion unless it is 
expressly declared in that Act that the Dominion 
has requested, and consented to, the enactment 
thereof. 
 
The courts still recognised, nonethe- 
less, that Parliament's power to legislate 
remained unimpaired as a matter of strict 
law. In relation to Canada, Viscount Sankey 
L.C. acknowledged that it did so in the Brit- 
ish Coal Corporation case (1935)' 4, 
 
It is doubtless true that the power ofthe Imperial 
Parliament to pass on its own initiative any 
legislation that it thought fit extending to Canada 
remains in theory unimpaired: indeed, the 
Imperial Parliament could, as a matter of abstract 
law, repeal or disregard s. 4 of the Statute. But 
that is theory and has no relation to realities. In 
truth Canada is in enjoyment of thefull scope of self- 
go emment  ... 
 
Lord Denning M.R. in the Blackburn case 
(1971) similarly acknowledged Parliament's 
 
 
6:: , 
unimpaired power to legislate and also em- 
phasised the consequent artiftcialityZ5, 
 
We have all been brought up to believe that, in le- 
gal theory, one Parliament cannot bind another 
and that no Act is irreversible. But legal theory 
does not always march alongside practical real- 
ity. Take the Statute of Westminster 1931, which 
takes away the power of Parliament to legislate 
for the Dominions. Can one imagine that Parlia- 
ment could or would reverse that Statute? Take 
the Acts which have granted independence to the 
Dominions and territories overseas. Can anyone 
imagine that Parliament could or would reverse 
those laws and take away their independence? 
Most clearly not. Freedom once given cannot be 
taken away. Legal theory must give way to prac- 
tical politics. 
 
The UK Parliament's legal and political 
conceptions of sovereignty -limitless in le- 
gal theory, but limited in practical politics- 
were thus a source of unease and, earlier, of 
some instability (<<a double-edged sword>> 
according  to  excellent  recent  work)Z 6. 
Fortunately, sovereignty was usually exer- 
cised with political restraint - a pragmatic 
concession to the geographical distance of 
Britain from its colonies and dominions - 
and with the light touch of a <<constitutional 
ethic ... of laissez-faire>> at least towards 
those that were self-governingZ7. 
 
 
 
 
3.:: ,. A second manifestation  ofthe formal 
legal conception of Parliament's sovereignty 
at work has been the increased use of "Henry 
VIII clauses" through the course of the last 
century. They have been named after claus- 
es in Acts of Parliament by which sweeping 
law-making  powers  were  conferred  upon 
King Henry VIII, especially in the infamous 
Statute of Proclamations of 1539 (31 Henry 
VIII, c. 8) by which the King's proclamations 
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were to have the sameforce asActs ofParlia- 3.3. A third manifestation of the formal 
ment subject to restrictions (the absence of 
prejudice to inheritances, liberties, goods 
etc.). The statute was repealed on Henry VI- 
II's  deathini547· 
In this and the last century Henry VIII 
clauses have involved the grant of powers 
to the executive to legislate by executive 
order and thereby amend what Parliament 
has enactedZ8. The Human Rights Act 1998, 
section 10, is a well- known example in pro- 
viding for fast-track ministerial amend- 
ment of parliamentary legislation to be 
incompatible with European Convention 
rights, subjectto a process of parliamentary 
approval provided for in schedule to the 
Act. Henry VIII clauses have been a particu- 
lar concern of Lord Igor Judge, former Lord 
Chief Justice of England and Wales, as a 
circumvention of Parliament's substantive 
role and functionZ9. Although <<when these 
Henry VIII clauses are introduced they will 
always be said to be necessary>> and are the 
outcome of the exercise of Parliament's for- 
mal legal sovereignty, Lord Judge has por- 
trayed them as detrimental to Parliament's 
actual substantive sovereignty: 
 
Half a moment's thought will demonstrate that 
proliferation of clauses like these will have the 
inevitable consequence of yet further damaging 
the sovereignty of Parliament, and  increasing 
yet further the authority of the executive over the 
legislature
30 
. 
 
On the premise of detriment to the sov- 
ereignty of Parliament, Lord Judge has con- 
eluded that <<Henry VIII clauses should be 
confmed to the dustbin of history>> 3'. They 
are highly unlikely to be so confmed. Rath- 
er, their greatly increased and prominent 
use may well again be said to be necessary 
so as to effect the legal changes pursuant to 
Brexit3Z. 
legal conception at work has been the West- 
minster Parliament's asymmetric devolu- 
tion of governing powers to Scotland, Wales 
and  Northern  Ireland,  in which  express 
provision has been made, as in the Scot- 
land Act 1998, for the conferral of legisla- 
tive competence on the Scottish Parliament 
not to <<affect the power of the Parliament 
of the United Kingdom to make laws for 
Scotland>> 33. Shortly before Tony Bair be- 
came Prime Minister, he said as much in 
the 1997 General Election campaign. When 
interviewed on the implications of the La- 
bour Party's Scottish legislative devolution 
proposals  in their manifesto,  he stressed 
that sovereignty would still belong solely to 
the Westminster Parliament, that it <<rests 
with me as an English MP and that's the way 
it will stay>> 34. Then, maintaining that his 
fwe-yearpledge on tax <<applies to Scotland 
as it does to England>>, he made the polit- 
ical blunder of comparing the tax-varying 
powers of the proposed Scottish Parliament 
to those of an English parish council (a civ- 
illocal authority in the fust tier of English 
local government), thus only holding pow- 
ers at the behest of the Westminster Parlia- 
ment. Tony Blair's comparison attracted at- 
tention because of its expected remoteness 
from what the likely political reality would 
be, and it was a blunder in the Scottish 
context because it flatly contradicted the 
substantive appeal of devolution (that is, of 
real substantive legislative power) to many 
Scots, in asserting the Westminster Parlia- 
ment' s retention of formal sovereignty. 
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3-4- A fourth manifestation, for brief 
consideration before I return to the Euro- 
pean Communities Act 197 and sovereign- 
ty in relation to the EU, is the European Un- 
ion Referendum Act 015, providing for the 
holding of a referendum on whether the UK 
should remain a member of the EU. This 
was also an exercise of formal legislative 
sovereignty with far-reaching substantive 
effects of which we are now all too aware - a 
highly questionable open-ended abroga- 
tion of substantive parliamentary respon- 
sibility and the invocation of direct democ- 
racy on a technical and multi-faceted issue 
or, rather, a multiplicity of such issues. 
Behind the unease accompanying these 
four profound exercises of Parliament's 
formal legal sovereignty are substantive 
conceptions of the necessarily, or unduly, 
limited actuality of the scope of its sover- 
eignty in consequence. Various commenta- 
tors have therefore identified divergence in 
the reality of Parliament's sovereignty from 
its  accepted  or  traditional  legal  form3 
have concluded that it still remains <<for- 
mally intact as a matter of law>> but ques- 
tionable in <<practical realism>> 36, or have 
sort to take full account of the reality of the 
increasingly complex substantive political 
and legal constraints upon it3 
 
 
 
 
3.s. Two further doctrinal conceptions of 
Parliament's sovereignty are distinguish- 
able and are worth mentioning because of 
the tension between form and  substance 
that has been manifest in their invocation 
or elaboration. 
The one conception has been of a mod- 
ified sovereignty of Parliament, exercising 
plenary  power  inclusive  of  the  power  to 
make  laws binding itself  in respect  of  its 
own  procedure  and  legislative  forms  (for 
example, precluding an Act of Parliament's 
implied repeal by a later enactment). It is of 
a Parliament  empowered  to make  binding 
laws <<that do not in any way diminish par- 
liament's substantive power>> but precisely 
so as <<to protect itself from its own inad- 
vertence>>  and thus  keep  the  substantive 
law-making  power  unaffected 38.  Formal 
restrictions on Parliament's sovereignty 
have been advocated to secure its substance. 
The other  doctrinal conception has 
been of a formal, capacious and legally fic- 
titious conception centred on the presumed 
intention ofthe presumed-to-he-all-pow- 
erful Parliament, an intention inferred also 
from Parliament's inaction. It has been in- 
voked in the context of English administra- 
tive law to provide constitutional justifica- 
tion for what developed beyond Parliament, 
in particular to provide justification for the 
grounds for the judicial review of admin- 
istrative action, which developed through 
the exercise of what has traditionally been 
viewed as the English courts' original ju- 
risdiction to supervise administrative and 
other governing authorities. Heavy reli- 
ance has been placed on the argument that 
<<what an all powerful Parliament does not 
prohibit, it must authorise either express- 
ly or impliedly>> 39. Thus, when Parliament 
has not legislated to alter the general effect 
of a court decision or decisions in the judi- 
cial review of administrative action, it has 
been taken to authorise, specifically or in 
general, the accompanying development of 
the grounds of review. The English courts, 
then, in finding administrative action ultra 
vires, i.e. beyond the administrative body's 
powers, on the basis of a ground of review, 
are taken to have been acting in accordance 
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with the presumed intention of the sover- 
eign Parliament that the courts develop that 
ground in particular and/or the rule of law 
more generally4°. Constitutional justiftca- 
tion though recourse to the presumed  in- 
tention  ofthe  presumed-to-he-all-power- 
ful Parliament in the doctrine of ultra vires 
has been expressly promoted by its leading 
early advocate as a necessary ftg leaf, which 
does not deceive anyone, to avoid or con- 
ceal conflict between the role of the courts 
and that of Parliament4'. The ftg leaf is rea- 
son to reflect on the steadfastness of that 
love for legal forms and acquiescence  in 
legal ftctions of the English legal spirit of 
which Dicey spoke in his comparative con- 
stitutionallectures4Z_ This time it has been 
exemplifted in a presumed, capacious and 
legally ftctitious intention of a presumed- 
to- he-all-powerful  sovereign  Parliament. 
Not surprisingly, this invocation and elab- 
oration of Parliament's sovereignty, in de- 
veloping the doctrine of ultra vires so as to 
justify judge-made English administrative 
law, has attracted severe criticism for its 
excessive legal formalism43 . 
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A further, fundamental, manifestation of 
the exercise of the Westminster Parlia- 
ment' s formal legal sovereignty and of pro- 
found implications for its substance was the 
effective transfer of certain central and sub- 
stantive legislative and adjudicative powers 
to what became the institutions of the Eu- 
ropean Union, in domestic law through the 
European Communities Act 197 . 
Before  Britain  joined  the  European 
Communities, the doctrine of the suprem- 
acy of Community law was well established 
in the case law of the ECJ. Re-reading, 
with Brexit in mind, the judicial dicta from 
the leading ECJ cases on the supremacy of 
Community law, I am struck more than I 
previously was by their assertiveness and 
uncompromising lack of qualiftcation. 
From the  ECJ's judgment  in 1964 in 
Costa v. ENEL44 we have the following: 
 
The integration into the laws of each Member 
State of provisions which derive from the Com- 
munity, and more generally the terms and the 
spirit of the Treaty, make it impossible for the 
States, as a corollary, to accord precedence to a 
unilateral and subsequent measure over a legal 
system accepted by them on a basis of reciprocity. 
Such a measure cannot therefore be inconsistent 
with that legal system. [...] It follows from all 
these observations that the law stemming from 
the Treaty, an independent source of law, could 
not, because of its special and original nature, be 
overridden by domestic legal provisions, how- 
ever framed, without being deprived of its char- 
acter as Community law and without the legal 
basis of the Community itself being called into 
question. The transfer by the States from their 
domestic legal system to the Community legal 
system of the rights and obligations arising un- 
der the Treaty carries with it a permanent limi- 
tation of their sovereign rights, against which a 
subsequent unilateral act incompatible with the 
concept of the Community cannot prevail. 
 
From the ECJ's judgment  in  1970  in 
the Intemationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH 
case45 we have further: 
 
Recourse to the legal rules or concepts of nation- 
allaw in order to judge the validity of measures 
adopted by the institutions of the Community 
would have an adverse effect on the uniformity 
and efficacy of Community law. The validity of 
such measures can only be judged in the light of 
Community law. In fact, the law stemming from 
the Treaty, an independence source of law, can- 
not because of its very nature be overridden by 
rules of national law, however framed, without 
being deprived of its character as Community law 
Allison 
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and without the legal basis of the Community it- 
self being called into question. Therefore the va- 
lidity of a Community measure or its effect within 
a Member State cannot be affected by allegations 
that it runs counter to either fundamental rights 
as formulated by the constitution of that State or 
principles of a national constitutional structure. 
 
Unmistakeable in these passages are the 
strong assertions about what was possible, 
or rather <<impossible for the States, as a 
corollary>>  of acceptance and reciprocity, 
assumptions,  indeed  question-begging4 6, 
about the <<original nature>> of Communi- 
ty law, its <<very nature>>, thus with a given 
or pre-determined character, <<the concept 
of the Community>>, its <<legal basis>>, and 
the priority accorded to the <<uniformity 
and efftcacy of Community law>> as essen- 
tial for the working of the common market. 
In short, the lack of judicial restraint, ex- 
planation and any conceivable condition, 
qualiftcation or  alternative  is  striking,  as 
is the patency of assertion of Community 
law's supremacy. It was an assertion of legal 
supremacy not tempered by the geographi- 
cal remoteness of the areas over which su- 
premacy was being claimed and exercised, 
as had  been the case in the much earlier, 
British imperial, form of transnational, 
indeed transcontinental, constitutional- 
ism47. 
Britain joined,  nonetheless, the Euro- 
pean  Communities,  and the Westminster 
Parliament  has  provided  for  the  imple- 
mentation of the relevant Treaties (now the 
EU Treaties) in the European Communities 
Act 197 - Sub-section  (4) of the Act has 
required that <<any enactment passed or to 
be passed . .. shall be construed and have 
effect subject to the foregoing provisions>>. 
As those familiar with the development of 
EU law in the UK will know, the domestic 
crunch came in the Factortame litigation. 
On a preliminary reference to the ECJ from 
the House of Lords in the ftrst Factortame 
case48, the ECJ re-asserted  that require- 
ments  to  secure  the  full  force  and  effec- 
tiveness of Community law were its <<very 
essence>> and ruled that, if the sole obstacle 
to granting effective  interim  relief  for the 
protection  of  rights under Community law 
was a rule of national law, that rule of na- 
tionallaw must be set aside49. On the facts, 
the disapplication of provisions of the Mer- 
chant Shipping Act  1988 was thus required 
under   Community   law.   In   the   second 
Factortame case, the House of Lords (as it 
then was) acted accordingly, and in very few 
words. Of the Law Lords, only Lord Bridge 
spoke of implications for Parliament's  sov- 
ereignty.  In  answer  to  comments  in  the 
press that this was a <<novel and dangerous 
invasion by a Community institution of the 
sovereignty>>  of the UK Parliament, Lord 
Bridge  asserted that those  comments were 
<<based  on a misconception>> 5°.  On the 
basis that Parliament, in passing the Euro- 
pean Communities Act 197 , had accepted 
whatever limitation of its sovereignty was 
involved, he concluded that <<there is noth- 
ing in any way novel in according suprema- 
cy to rules of Community law in those areas 
to which they apply>> 51 What was undoubt- 
edly novel, however, was abandonment, in 
context, of the doctrine of implied repeal: 
the later Merchant Shipping Act 1988 was 
not taken to have repealed by implication 
the earlier European Communities Act 
197 - Lord Bridge said nothing at all about 
implied repeal. 
Shortly  thereafter,  in  contributing  to 
the Liber Amicorum for Lord Slynn (former 
Attorney General of the ECJ), I depicted the 
second Factortame case as an illustration of 
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English judicial minimalism - <<the econ- 
omy of the common law>>sz. Looking back 
after the Brexit Referendum and with the 
benefit of hindsight, I am less sanguine 
than I was, necessitating reconsideration 
and, I would suggest, a change of emphasis. 
The  second Factortame  case  has  been 
relevant to Brexit, I would argue, alongside 
much else besides, both by accident and by 
design. Relevant by accident was also, for 
example, the expectation that the referen- 
dum called would never actually be held, 
because  pollsters  were  consistently  pre- 
dicting a hung Parliament and the resist- 
ance of a coalition government. Relevant by 
design was also, for example, the Remain 
campaign's  deciding  to  avoid  sustained 
emphasis on the various advantages of EU 
membership,  on the basis that their own 
early referendum polling suggested that the 
economic impact or risk arguments would 
attract more support. The many causes of 
Brexit are undeniable, but the decision in 
the second Factortame case, to which Suel- 
la Fernandes MP expressly referred in the 
Brexit debate in Queens' College, was pre- 
sented  as minimalist  or  economical  and 
may have seemed so, at least at the time, 
but was also insufficiently explained and 
justified. In response to the ECJ' s renewed 
assertion of the supremacy of Community 
law, provisions of the Merchant Shipping 
Act 1988 were disapplied, directly negating 
the formal sovereignty of the Westminster 
Parliament as exercised in the most recent 
applicable parliamentary enactment - a di- 
rect negation, both by the ECJ and by the 
highest British court, of one of the residual 
legal forms and fictions of the English legal 
spirit described by Dicey (although along- 
side  various  substantive  conceptions  of 
Parliament's sovereignty, as argued above). 
The doctrine of the implied repeal of an 
inconsistent earlier Act of Parliament by a 
later one to the extent of the inconsistency 
was abandoned in relation to the Europe- 
an Communities Act 197 , but without any 
recognition or explanation. 
The abandonment of the doctrine of 
implied repeal in the second Factortame 
case not only negated the formal concep- 
tion of Parliament's sovereignty as tradi- 
tionally understood. It also confirmed in 
effect a significant political obstacle to the 
exercise of Parliament's substantive sover- 
eign power to respond pragmatically to new 
situations as they arise in areas subject to 
Community law. The possibility of express 
repeal  of  the  European  Communities  Act 
197 surely remained53, but short of such 
a drastic measure - short of that express 
and substantive political exercise of Parlia- 
ment's  sovereignty- the thorough  imple- 
mentation of EU law through the 197 Act 
and the working of the ECJ' s doctrines of 
direct effect and supremacy of Community 
law secured and maintained the day-to-day 
application of large swathes of EU law in the 
UK. In the second Factortame case, the ef- 
fect of the House of Lord's decision on both 
the formal legal and substantive political 
conceptions of Parliament's sovereignty re- 
quired considerably more judicial attention 
than it received. The decision amounted to 
little more than <<general obfuscation>>, 
one of the forms of the common law's econ- 
omy listed in The English Historical Constitu- 
tion54. It was, however, an extreme mani- 
festation that has now proved to be unstable 
- a false economy - through the starkness of 
the failure to explain or even acknowledge 
pressing issues at stake and thus not clearly 
or specifically to address them. 
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In short, the ECJ's unrestrained and 
unqualified assertion of the supremacy of 
Community law, and the British courts very 
apparent but poorly explained and justified, 
indeed barely mentioned, acceptance of it, 
constituted a soft target for euro-sceptics. 
It afforded little with which to address even 
intellectual or academic legal euro-scep- 
ticism, which, through various twists and 
turns, contributed to the outcome of the 
Brexit referendum. Pressing issues of Par- 
liament's sovereignty were inadequately 
recognised and explained, and left unre- 
solved, serving as sources of instability. 
 
 
 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
 
Let me conclude by briefly considering 
doctrinal and constitutional options and 
implications for the UK and by raising 
questions for the EU. 
In responding to the UK's formal le- 
gal and substantive political conceptions 
of Parliament's sovereignty, there would 
seem to be three general options, the rela- 
tive merits and demerits of which warrant a 
few words now but also further thought, in- 
vestigation and elaboration well beyond the 
scope of this lecture. 
The first option is doctrinal tradition- 
alism. It is the option of remaining true to 
Diceyan orthodoxy by keeping the formal 
legal conception of Parliament's sovereign- 
ty for the courtroom and out of the political 
arena, where the substantive conception is 
appropriate. Whether or how the European 
Union was an enhancement or diminution 
of Parliament's  substantive political  sov- 
ereignty should thus have been central in 
considering  Brexit.  For various  reasons, 
taking this option is not as easy as it might 
seem. Formal legal conceptions slip easily 
into the English political arena, histori- 
cally as Dicey observed55, and as debating 
Brexit has shown. Further, are we in Britain 
not yet exhausted of all these constitution- 
allegal forms and fictions, their unreality, 
and in this instance, the varying tension of 
a formal legal conception of Parliament's 
sovereignty with a substantive political 
conception? And Dicey's The Law of the 
Constitution may have served as the English 
substitute for a written constitution in the 
past56, but no longer does so, even or espe- 
cially on the issue of sovereignty57. 
A second option is renewed doctrinal 
and judicial clarification, adaptation and 
justification of form, substance and their 
interaction in the exercise of sovereignty, 
so as to reduce the tension or remove the di- 
chotomy between formal legal and substan- 
tive political conceptions58. But how exactly 
to unravel and retie the legal political sov- 
ereignty knot remains unclear, as does how 
to do so without judicial endorsement of 
constraints upon Parliament's sovereignty 
that might well still be seen, in traditional 
terms, to jeopardise the independence of 
the courts and to encroach unacceptably 
upon that sovereignty. The legitimacy of the 
doctrinal and judicial reformation might 
well remain elusive or questionable. 
A third option, for the sake of legiti- 
macy, is juridicalisation or juridification 
(to use the key word in the ReConFort pro- 
ject) in a fully codified constitution, set- 
ting out a separation of powers, the powers 
and responsibilities of the courts and of 
Parliament, provisions for constitutional 
amendment, and so forth. Despite Jeremy 
Bentham's early, strong and prominent 
advocacy of codification of the whole of 
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the English common law, Britain has shied 
away from it, especially from codification of 
its historical or unwritten constitution59. 
Further, taking on the huge and daunting 
political and legal task of introducing a cod- 
ified constitution remains remote amidst 
all the governmental political and legal 
work that will accompany Brexit. 
On  constitutional  implications   for 
the EU, I can only express doubts and ask 
questions, because my area of expertise is 
not EU law. Was there sufficient pragmatic 
self-restraint in the unqualified assertion 
and development of the doctrine of the su- 
premacy of Community law? Was enough 
done by the ECJ to refine, explain and justi- 
fy the doctrine? Finally, was the seemingly 
implicit positivist methodology of a hier- 
archy of legal sources with a change of the 
Grundnmm on offer in the legal orders of 
member states up to the task of justification 
and securing legitimacy? 
On the Way to furidiftcation by Constitu- 
tion is the title of your conference. I would 
agree what we are only on the way, because 
much more is needed by way of clarification 
and principled justification, especially on 
issues of sovereignty, for the constitutional 
legitimacy of political orders to be secure- 
ly established, both in Britain and seem- 
ingly in the European Union. Much more 
is needed, at least on the one hand, if one 
assumes, as I have now done, that "juridi- 
fication" involves substantive justification 
for the sake of legitimacy. If, on the other 
hand, "juridification" is meant as a nar- 
row technical pursuit of legal clarity in a 
political order's sources of law, such jurid- 
ification seems insufficient per se to estab- 
lish legitimacy. What is still needed, in the 
English context at least, is both clarification 
and further principled justification on is- 
sues of sovereignty, especially if populist or 
nationalist challenges, advanced under the 
banner of sovereignty, are to be met effec- 
tively. This basic need makes your project, 
of which this conference is a product, all the 
more pertinent and important. 
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